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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The State appeals from an interlocutory order suppressing evidence 
seized pursuant to a search warrant. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(d). 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The State has adequately identified the statutes and constitutional 
provisions of central importance to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Issue. Did the trial court correctly rule that the independent source 
doctrine did not apply because officers violated the knock-and-announce 
statute without justification, the evidence was seized by the State and there 
could never be a source for the evidence independent of the prior illegality? 
Mr. Zesiger agrees with the preservation of the issue and standard of 
review set forth by the State. See State's Brief at 1. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In addition to the case history outlined by the State, this Court should be 
aware of the following: 
As a result of the violation of the knock-and-announce statute during the 
service of the first search warrant, the trial court suppressed the computer 
equipment seized as well as written and oral statements made by Mr. Zesiger 
during the execution of the first search warrant. R. 167-78 (State's Addendum 
B). The only evidence at issue in the execution of the second search warrant 
is the computer equipment that was momentarily returned to Mr. Zesiger and 
then immediately re-seized pursuant to the second search warrant. R. 255, 
V 3 (State's Addendum D). 
After the computer was seized pursuant to the first search warrant, its 
contents were searched, copied and examined by the State. R. 268:18-19. 
The first search warrant was authorized by Judge Clint S. Judkins of the 
First District Court on December 10,1999. R. 14-15. Judge Judkins was also 
the judge who granted the motion to suppress. R. 167-69. The affidavit in 
support of the second search warrant was presented to a different judge on 
November 30, 2001, Judge Jeffrey R. Burbank. R. 179; see also Findings, 
Second Motion to Suppress, R. 254 ^ 11. 
Finally, the trial court ruled that that the independent source doctrine did 
not apply in this case for two specific reasons. First, because "the illegal taint 
on the evidence was not removed by the subsequent service of the Second 
Search Warrant." Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Granting 
Second Motion to Suppress, R. 255 ^ 2. Second, the trial court also concluded 
that the independent source doctrine should not be applied to violations of the 
knock-and-announce statute. Id. at ]f 3. 
2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State conceded to Mr. Zesiger's first Motion to Suppress before the 
trial court. The State specifically conceded that the computer equipment was 
seized and Mr. Zesiger's written and oral statements were obtained in violation 
of Utah's knock-and-announce statute. The State also conceded to exclusion 
of the evidence. The application of the exclusionary rule to the first search 
warrant has not been appealed and is not before this Court. 
The execution of the second search warrant does not remedy the initial 
constitutional violation. The evidence seized by the State during the execution 
of the first search warrant is tainted by the prior illegality. The State seeks to 
expand the scope of the independent source doctrine in this case. However, 
the independent source doctrine requires that the State demonstrate that the 
later, lawful seizure be genuinely independent of the prior illegal seizure. The 
State cannot do so in this case because evidence was unlawfully seized, 
searched and retained. Momentarily returning the computer equipment to Mr. 
Zesiger and then immediately re-seizing the computer does attenuate the 
illegal taint on the evidence. The trial court correctly ruled that the independent 
source doctrine does not apply to this case. 
3 
ARGUMENT f 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE 
EXECUTION OF THE SECOND SEARCH WARRANT DOES 
NOT REMEDY THE TAINT ON THE EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM 
MR. ZESIGER IN VIOLATION OF UTAH'S KNOCK-AND-
ANNOUNCE STATUTE. 
A. The State has Not Challenged the Trial Court's First 
Suppression Order. 
The State conceded before the trial court that the evidence seized during 
the execution of the first search warrant was obtained in violation of Utah's 
knock-and-announce statute. See State's Concession to Defendant's Motion 
to Suppress, R. 161-162 ^ 4 (Addendum A). The State also conceded to 
suppression of the evidence seized as a result of the violation. Id. The Order 
granting Mr. Zesiger's Motion to Suppress regarding the execution of the first 
search warrant was not appealed by the State and is not before this Court.1 
B. The State Has Conceded that Officers 
Violated Utah's Knock-and-Announce 
Statute Without Justification When 
Executing the First Search Warrant. 
When police officers execute a search warrant, they must ordinarily 
provide notice of their authority and purpose before entering the premises they 
intend to search. State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700, 701 (Utah 1988). This rule is 
1
 The State indicates in its Brief that "it appears that suppression in the first 
instance was inappropriate." State's Brief at 23. This ruling was not appealed 
4 
commonly referred to as the "knock-and-announce" requirement. This rule has 
longstanding history in the United States and has origins in England from 
almost four hundred years ago. Id. This rule serves to protect a number of 
interests, specifically, (1) the protection of the privacy of an individual in his or 
her home, (2) the prevention of violence that could result in an unannounced 
entry into a private home, (3) the prevention of damage to the physical 
structures that can occur with forced entry. Id. (citing Payne v. United States, 
508 F.2d 1391,1939-94 (5th Cir. 1975); other citations omitted). 
The Utah Legislature has codified this longstanding requirement in Utah 
Code Ann. §77-23-210. Utah's knock-and-announce statute provides: 
When a search warrant has been issued authorizing entry into any 
building, room, conveyance, compartment, or other enclosure, the officer 
executing the warrant may use such force as is reasonably necessary to 
enter: 
(1) If, after notice of his authority and purpose, there is no response or 
he is not admitted with reasonable promptness . . . . 
(emphasis added). Utah is one of thirty-three states that have adopted 
statutes that require that law enforcement provide notice prior to entry. See 
Mark Josephson, Note, Fourth Amendment - Must Police Knock and 
Announce Themselves Before Kicking in the Door of a House?, 86 J. Crim. L. 
& Criminology 1229,1239 (1996) (citations omitted). 
This Court addressed violation of Utah's knock-and-announce statute in 
by the State and is beyond the scope of this appeal. 
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State v. Ribe, 876 P.2d 403 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In Ribe, officers were 
serving a knock-and-announce search warrant. When they approached the 
residence of the defendant, they observed the defendant outside his front door 
and saw him flee the scene. Id. at 404. While some officers pursued the 
defendant, another officer approached the residence, opened the closed storm 
door, yelled "police" and ran into the home. The officer did not knock on the 
door and wait for someone to answer the door. Id. This Court held that this 
unjustified violation of the knock-and-announce statute warranted suppression 
of the evidence that was seized. Id. at 415.2 
In Mr. Zesiger's case, officers obtained a knock-and-announce warrant. 
R. 14. Mr. Zesiger lived in a dorm apartment at Utah State University. The 
apartment contained three subapartments. Officers failed to knock and 
announce themselves at the door to subapartment 306(ef) occupied by Mr. 
Zesiger. R. 159 ffij 6, 7,11,12. The State did not assert exigent 
circumstances to justify the violation. Ultimately, the State conceded that this 
conduct violated the knock-and-announce statute and conceded to 
suppression of the evidence in this matter. R. 161-62 (Addendum A). There 
was no justification for the violation of the knock-and-announce statute. The 
2
 The Utah Supreme Court has held that when a knock-and-announce violation 
occurs when no one is at home, suppression of the evidence is not warranted. 
State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700, 703 (Utah 1988). There is no dispute in the 
instant case that Mr. Zesiger was in his dorm room when the first search 
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trial court correctly excluded all evidence seized as a result of the violation. 
C. The Independent Source Doctrine Does Not 
Apply to Violations of the Knock-and-Announce Statute 
When Law Enforcement has Seized Evidence During 
the Unlawful Search. 
The independent source doctrine does not apply in situations where 
officers have unlawfully seized and searched evidence in violation of the 
knock-and-announce requirement and then a second search warrant is 
obtained and executed. The typical application of the independent source 
doctrine has been in situations where law enforcement has made an illegal 
entry, but has not seized the evidence that is ultimately seized with a valid 
search warrant. The cases cited by the State do not support the application of 
the independent source doctrine in this matter. 
The exclusionary rule prohibits the government from introducing 
evidence that has been obtained as a result of an unlawful search. Murray v. 
United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988) (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 
U.S. 383 (1914)). The rule also extends to evidence that is "the product of the 
primary evidence, or that is otherwise acquired as an indirect result of the 
unlawful search, up to the point at which the connection with the unlawful 
search becomes 'so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.'" Murray, 487 U.S. at 
537 (quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)); see also 
warrant was executed. R. 269: 9-10. 
7 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,484-85 (1963). 
The independent source doctrine provides an exception to the 
exclusionary rule. The rule provides that the government will be permitted to 
introduce challenged evidence if the government can demonstrate that a 
subsequent lawful seizure is "genuinely independent" of a prior illegal search. 
Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 (1988). The United States 
Supreme Court has held that application of the doctrine is warranted when the 
government has made an unlawful entry, but has not seized evidence until a 
search warrant is obtained. 
For example, in the case of Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 
(1988) officers had evidence that there was marijuana in a warehouse. The 
officers illegally entered the warehouse, observed marijuana, and then left to 
get a warrant. The officers did not include any information they obtained as a 
result of the illegal entry to get the search warrant. Id. 535-36. The search 
warrant was ultimately executed and the United States Supreme Court ruled 
that the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant was admissible because the 
subsequent search warrant relied upon independent evidence, not the 
evidence obtained as a result of the illegal entry. The officers did not seize 
any evidence during the illegal entry. 
The United States Supreme Court makes specific mention of the 
potential problem when property is actually seized and kept in police custody: 
8 
So long as a later, lawful seizure is genuinely independent of an 
earlier, tainted one {which may well be difficult to establish where 
the seized goods are kept in the police's possession) there is no 
reason why the independent source doctrine should not apply. 
Id. at 542 (emphasis added). See also Segura v. United States, 468 
U.S. 796, 799-801 (1984) (after initial illegal entry, no items were seized 
or searched, agents waited in apartment until search warrant obtained, 
United States Supreme Court held that independent source doctrine 
applied to all items ultimately seized and searched pursuant to the valid 
warrant). The dicta contained in Murray is instructive in this case.. 
There is no mechanism by which the second seizure of the 
computer in this case can be "genuinely independent" of the first tainted 
search. The evidence was actually seized, search and taken into police 
custody as a result of the constitutional violation. 
This Court addressed the independent source doctrine in State v. 
Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In Northrup, officers 
made an illegal entry into the Defendant's home. While in the home, 
they observed contraband in plain view. However, nothing was 
confiscated and the home was not searched until a search warrant 
arrived hours later. Id. at 1290. As in the United States Supreme Court 
cases, this Court emphasized that although there was an illegal entry, 
there was no seizure of any evidence: 
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[T]he evidence was not disturbed or confiscated until the warrant 
arrived. Even though the officers saw the evidence, no 
meaningful interference with Northrup's property interest occurred 
until the evidence was confiscated after the arrival of the warrant. 
Id. at 1294 (emphasis added). The opinion states that evidence is seized 
"when 'there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory 
interest in that property.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 
109,113 (1984)). Again, as in the United States Supreme Court cases, of 
central importance in the application of the independent source doctrine is the 
fact that officers do not actually seize the evidence until after a valid warrant is 
obtained. 
When a knock-and-announce violation occurs in the execution of a 
warrant and evidence is seized as a result, as in Mr. Zesiger's case, the taint 
from that illegality cannot be remedied by the State. By contrast, if a knock-
and-announce violation occurs, and evidence is not seized, and an 
independent and lawful search takes place, the doctrine may apply.3 For 
example, in State v. Shively, 999 P.2d 259 (Kan. 2000), the Kansas Supreme 
Court addressed the issue of application of the independent source doctrine to 
3
 Other jurisdictions have explicitly rejected the application of the independent 
source doctrine in knock-and-announce violation cases involving one search. 
See e.g., United States v. Marts, 986 F.2d 1216 (8th Cir. 1993) (in a case 
involving one search in violation of the knock-and-announce rule, the court 
rejected the application of the independent source doctrine and stated it render 
the knock and announce rule "meaningless since an officer could obviate legal 
entry in every instance simply by looking to the information used to obtain the 
10 
knock-and-announce violations when evidence is not seized as a result of the 
violation. Shivley involves the service of two search warrants. In the 
execution of the first warrant, officers simply battered down two doors to the 
residence. Id. at 260-61. An officer was killed by the Defendant who testified 
that he thought someone was breaking into his home. The court held that the 
first search warrant was served in violation of the principle of announcement 
under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 263. 
As in Murray and Northrup, officers did not seize any items from the 
residence but sealed off the residence and then obtained a second search 
warrant. Shivley, 999 P.2d at 261. The Kansas Supreme Court held that: 
the second search was held to be constitutionally sufficient 
because no physical items were seized under the initial search 
warrant and because the second search warrant was based in 
substantial part on the first affidavit and did not rely on any 
additional information obtained in the first raid as to Shively's drug 
activity. 
Shively, 999 P.2d at 264 (emphasis added). Of central importance to 
the court in application of the independent source doctrine was the fact 
that no evidence was actually seized by the government until after the 
service of the second search warrant.4 
warrant"). 
4
 It should also be noted that in Shively the court noted that the "same judge 
who found probable cause to issue the first warrant to search for drug-related 
evidence issued the second search warrant as well." 999 P.2d at 264-65. In 
Mr. Zesiger's case, Judge Judkins issued the first search warrant (R. 14-15) 
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In all of the cases cited supra, whether the violation was a 
warrantless entry or a violation of the knock-and-announce rule, the 
government did not seize evidence until a valid warrant was in place. In 
such an instance, courts have held that the later, lawful search could be 
genuinely independent of the prior illegality. The same cannot be said in 
Mr. Zesiger's case. In this matter, the State conceded that the computer 
was illegally seized on December 13, 2001. R. 167-68. The computer 
equipment was seized, searched and retained by the State after the 
unlawful execution of the first search warrant. On November 30, 2002, 
the equipment was momentarily returned to Mr. Zesiger and then "re-
seized" pursuant to the second search warrant. R. 254-55, ffl[ 10-13. 
The State's actions do not alter the taint on the computer equipment 
evidence from the prior illegality.5 Once evidence is illegally seized, the 
independent source doctrine does not apply. 
and ordered the suppression of evidence obtained as a result of the knock-
and-announce violation. R. 167-69. The application for the second search 
warrant was presented to a different Judge, Judge Jeffrey R. Burbank. R. 179; 
see also Findings Re Second Motion to Suppress, R. 254, % 11. 
5
 In the event that this Court were to apply the independent source doctrine to 
the computer evidence re-seized pursuant to the second search warrant, Mr. 
Zesiger asserts that his oral and written statements obtained during the 
unlawful execution of the first search warrant should remain excluded. There 
is no basis for the State to claim an independent source for the statements, 
obtained from Mr. Zesiger during the execution of the first warrant. 
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CONCLUSION 
The State conceded before the trial court that officers violated the knock-
and-announce statute in executing the first search warrant. The trial court 
correctly concluded that simply serving a second search warrant and re-seizing 
the evidence unlawfully obtained does not remedy the previous constitutional 
violation. Once the computer equipment evidence was taken into State 
custody, there was no mechanism by which the State could attenuate the taint 
of the prior illegality. Mr. Zesiger respectfully urges this Court to affirm the trial 
court's Order suppressing the computer re-seized with the second search 
warrant. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
The Defendant joins in the State's request for oral argument. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s ^ d a y of | L ^ 1 , 2002. 
BUGDEN & ISAACSON, L.L.C. 
Attorneys for Tyler John Zesiger 
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STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
TYLER JOHN ZESIGER, 
Defendant. 
STATE'S CONCESSION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRES S AND REQUEST FOR 
JURY TRIAL SETTING 
Case No. 991100886 
Judge Clint S. Judkins 
COMES NOW, the State of Utah, by and through Scott L Wyatt, the Cache County 
Attorney, and hereby concedes to the court granting the defendant's Motion to Suppress; requests 
a trial setting and in support of the same represents to the court as follows: 
1. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress based on the investigators' failure to 
follow the state knock and announce statutory requirements. The state filed its response 
objecting to the motion. 
2. The court set oral argument on the motion on June 27, 2001, and the parties 
appeared and presented there relative positions. During the argument the court indicated that it 
would rule in favor of the defendant unless the state could provide case law to the contrary. Both 
parties were invited to engage in further research and present further memoranda on the matter. 
3. The defendant filed a Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion 
to Suppress. 
4. The state is still unable to find any case law on point to present to the court. 
Based on the court's statements, made on June 27, 2001, referred to above in paragraph "2" the 
<k\ 
state submits this matter and concedes to the court's granting of the defendant's motion on 
grounds that the state's investigators failed to comply with the knock-and-announce statute. 
5. With the motion to suppress resolved the state respectfully requests a trial setting 
so this matter may come to a final resolution. 
DATED this 3rd day of September, 2001. 
CACHE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
